Sunday, May 23, 2010

Reefer Gladness

United States v. Needham, No. 06-5652-cr (2d Cir. May 14, 2010) (Cabranes, Katzmann, Parker, CJJ)

The three defendants here were part of a larger group that was in the business of robbing drug dealers of drugs and drug proceeds. They were all convicted of a Hobbs Act conspiracy, which included robberies of cocaine and heroin dealers, and each was also convicted of one substantive count involving the robbery of a marijuana dealer. Consistent with circuit law at the time, the district court instructed the jury that “all illegal drug activity, even if it is purely local in nature,” affects interstate commerce. While the defendants’ appeal was pending, the circuit held that this instruction was wrong: proof of drug trafficking does not automatically prove an affect on interstate commerce. Instead, “even in drug cases, the jury must find such an effect as part of its verdict.” Finding plain error in the interstate commerce jury charge here, a divided panel court reversed the defendants’ substantive, marijuana-related robbery convictions, but affirmed on the conspiracy count.

The Majority’s View

Under current circuit law, the interstate effect cannot be “presumed” when the object of a robbery is to obtain illegal drugs or drug proceeds. This element, like any other, must be found by jury beyond a reasonable doubt.

Accordingly, the court treated the error here as a charge error, because the charge withheld an element from the jury’s consideration. But, since this was a plain error case, rather than assessing the record to determine whether the error was harmless, the court considered whether the error “affected substantial rights”; that is, “whether the error was prejudicial.” To make this decision, the majority “closely examine[d] the record to determine whether the jury, had it been properly instructed, would have found the jurisdictional element satisfied, or whether the government failed to prove this element beyond a reasonable doubt.”

The entire panel found the interstate element satisfied for the defendants’ conspiracy conviction. A conspiracy that “targets cocaine and heroin, and the proceeds from their sale, undoubtedly meets” the relevant legal standard - the “possibility or potential of an effect on interstate commerce, not an actual effect” - because those drugs “cannot be produced in New York, and thus necessarily travel in interstate commerce.” Thus, even though the government introduced no evidence to support this proposition, the jury was “capable of concluding, based on its lay knowledge, that cocaine is imported into the United States.” This, according to the court, satisfied the jurisdictional element “beyond a reasonable doubt.”

But two judges had a different view of the substantive convictions involving robberies of marijuana dealers. Apart from the large amounts of money involved in those robberies, the government “offered no evidence to support an interstate nexus,” such as proof that the marijuana originated out of state, was sold to out-of-state-customers, or that the victims crossed state lines in conducting their business or would have purchased goods in interstate commerce with the proceeds.

And, according to the majority, “marijuana may be grown, processed, and sold entirely within New York.” Thus, “reviewing for prejudice,” the majority found that the erroneous jury charge “may very well have affected the outcome of the district court proceedings.” The proof was “simply too bare to establish, without more, the required interstate nexus,” even though that nexus need be only “subtle or slight.” The majority refused to find that effect based solely on the amount of money involved in the robberies: “the sheer amount of money, standing alone, does not demonstrate an interstate effect.”

The Dissent

Judge Cabranes had a different view. He agreed that the jury instruction was erroneous. But he had “no trouble concluding beyond a reasonable doubt that the jury would have returned the guilty verdict even absent the instruction that was given.” He found no possibility that “the jury in this case could have concluded that the robberies at issue involved marijuana that was grown, processed, and sold entirely within New York” and was “confident” that the jurors would have found that at least some of the drugs or proceeds derived from interstate or foreign commerce “based on their lay knowledge and common sense.”

Moreover, Judge Cabranes was also “confident that a properly instructed jury would have found the required effect on commerce even if the jury had assumed that the marijuana in question was grown, processed, and sold entirely within New York.” To him, Congress actually has Commerce Clause power to prohibit the local cultivation and use of marijuana, thus, the robbery of the proceeds of even homegrown marijuana is covered by the Hobbs Act.


This decision prompts a couple of issues that require some further thought.

First, this decision reveals a serious problem with current Second Circuit interstate commerce jurisprudence. According to the court, the government need not introduce any evidence at all of interstate commerce for robberies involving heroin, cocaine or their proceeds, even though this is an element of the offense. There is dangerous and a slippery slope here. Many federal crimes have an interstate commerce element as the jurisdictional hook, and there is a real danger that this “we don’t need any evidence, just the jurors’ common sense” approach could be extended to other criminal statutes. Could jurors use their “common sense” to conclude that, say, stolen property from other states so commonly ends up in New York that the government need not introduce evidence on this element? A better rule would be to require the government actually introduce evidence on interstate commerce in every case where it is an element, and not just some of them. This would hardly be a burden - any law enforcement officer who knows anything about drugs could be an “expert” on the question.

The second weird thing about this decision is the relief granted. Although the majority found a prejudicial charge error on the substantive counts, it did not vacate those counts and remand for a new trial, as it typically does when there is a charge error, even one that dilutes or eliminates an element. Instead, the court reversed the convictions on the marijuana-based counts, which is typically the relief granted only where the court has found the evidence insufficient. Why would the majority secretly treat this as a sufficiency case, and not say what it is doing?

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